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ABSTRACT
Objectives: An overview of the status quo of parallel trade of
pharmaceuticals (pharmaceutical parallel trade [PPT]) was
performed. The different economic, political, and legal view-
points as well as the public health perspective are being taken
into consideration. Analysis is being undertaken on a world-
wide level, focusing on the situation of Switzerland in the
context of current developments in the United States as well
as in the European Union (EU).
Methods: Desktop analysis using publicly available informa-
tion (e.g., scientiﬁc literature, congress reports, ofﬁcial statis-
tical databases) was performed during the years 2006
through 2007. Such gathered information was compiled and
systematically structured to allow a crude overview of the
development of intellectual property law in the last 100 years
(as a prerequisite under which PPT legally can exist) as well
as a description of the health economic and political context
in which PPT is set currently.
Results: It could be shown that PPT is an ubiquitous
phenomenon, appearing in industrialized countries as well
as in the developing world. Economically, it has gained a
signiﬁcant weight in substantial parts of the EU in the last
decade. This has to be seen in the context of EU efforts of
enhanced economic and political integration. The worldwide
constant growth of health-care expenditures, with its strain
on national health-care budgets, has led to increased discus-
sions about the necessity and consequences including
possible dangers of PPT, namely, in the United States and in
Switzerland, where up to now PPT has been only of marginal
importance.
Conclusions: The analysis of the value of PPT depends
strongly on the importance that is given to different perspec-
tives by the individual analyst. It is clear that an item-
centered view of PPT is not able to analyze this phenomenon
in an equitable way. Further attempts have to be made to
standardize evaluation as well as to increase available infor-
mation to empower science and decision-makers to perform
objective analyses and informed decisions.
Keywords: comparative study, health economics, multi-
country economic evaluation, pharmaceutical pricing,
Switzerland.
Introduction
This article tries to give an overview of the current
international situation of pharmaceutical parallel trade
(PPT). Parallel trade is not limited to pharmaceutical
products (see later in the article, but because of the
special nature of pharmaceuticals, which differentiate
them from “normal” consumer goods, there are not
only economical facts to be given, but legal consider-
ations and political implications to be remembered.
This becomes clear—among others—when analyses of
the same phenomenon come to completely different,
sometimes even contradictory results, as it is the
case with the recent economic studies on this subject,
which will be shown next. Part of the reason for such
different results could lie in some shortcomings in eco-
nomic theory as well as in the limited availability of
appropriate data.
By giving an economic, legal, and political outline,
the reader of this article should be enabled to under-
stand the international status quo of PPT as well as the
different interests, policies, and aims of the individual
market participants.
Deﬁnition of PPT
Parallel trade is a phenomenon well known inter-
nationally: A common deﬁnition is worded in the
fundamental work of Arfwedson [1] as follows:
Re-importation (or parallel trade as it is known in
Europe) occurs when products protected by patent,
trademark or copyright are ﬁrst placed into circu-
lation on one market, then (re-) imported into a
second market without the authorization of the
original owner of the intellectual property rights
(IPRs).
Arfwedson concludes his deﬁnition with the remark
that “Myriad products are re-imported, including
Address correspondence to: Thomas N. Bart, Medical Coordi-
nation, Swiss Blood Stem Cells, Laupenstrasse 37, Bern 3008,
Switzerland. E-mail: thomas.bart@bloodstemcells.ch
10.1111/j.1524-4733.2008.00339.x
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed herein are the author’s per-
sonal opinion and do not necessarily represent his employer’s
view.
Volume 11 • Number 5 • 2008
V A L U E I N H E A LT H
996 © 2008, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) 1098-3015/08/996 996–1005
automobiles, clothing, perfume and other consumer
goods.” This shows to us that parallel trade is an
almost ubiquitous phenomenon (at the end of the last
decade, it was estimated, for instance, that up to 20%
of the market for Coca-Cola in the UK was served by
parallel imports coming from wholesalers in other
European countries [2]).
Price Differentials As Driving Forces
What are the reasons of this situation? Apparently,
there must be a strong driver for the international,
almost ubiquitous appearance of parallel trade: proﬁt,
or better said, price differences allowing ﬁrms to make
proﬁts in exploiting the possibility of arbitrage if trans-
action costs are low enough. Wherever there are sufﬁ-
cient price differentials to make movement of goods
economically viable, and a regulatory framework,
which permits it, parallel trade comes into action. In
the case of pharmaceuticals, Maskus [3] obtained
international ex-manufacturer’s prices and sales data
for major molecules (20 brand-name drugs) in 14
countries, for which he calculated average per dosage
prices (see Table 1). In the same study, he used data
from the Swedish Medical Products Agency for a
basket of 90 brand-name drugs (see Table 2) to make a
European price comparison.
Maskus [3] identiﬁed the price differentials on the
international as well as on the European level, with
low-price countries like Greece and Spain, and high-
price countries like the UK or Switzerland. Maskus
found that prices in many drugs were relatively low in
numerous developed countries, e.g., Canada, Italy, and
Spain, whereas in other less developed countries, e.g.,
Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa, they were relatively
high, which he explained mainly with the existence of
signiﬁcant price controls in countries with low prices.
Costs of marketing pharmaceutical parallel imports
(PPIs) are high—it is a tightly regulated industry with
rigorous standards and regulatory requirements, but
there are still enough margins to make it worthwhile,
and parallel trade in pharmaceuticals has grown con-
sistently in Europe. The market size has been estimated
at a value of EUR 4.2 billion in 2004 [4], a develop-
ment of between EUR 2.6 billion in 2001 and EUR 5.8
billion in 2006 [5], respectively.
Legal Background
Exhaustion and Its Different Forms
The deﬁnition of parallel import in Deardorff’s Glos-
sary of International Economics [6] is as follows:
Trade that is made possible when the owner of
intellectual property causes the same product to be
sold in different countries for different prices. If
someone else imports the low-price good into the
high-price country, that is a parallel import.
The legal basis of parallel import lies in the Euro-
pean principle of exhaustion and the American “ﬁrst-
sale doctrine,” which are explained in the following:
Exhaustion was developed in Germany in the early
20th century by the pioneering work of Josef Kohler
[7]. Its American equivalent, the “ﬁrst-sale doctrine,”
was established at roughly the same time by a decision
of the US Supreme Court in 1908 [8].
Exhaustion is one of the basic principles of intellec-
tual property (IP) law worldwide. The concept of
exhaustion can be explained in the following: Once
trademarked goods are put on the market by the trade-
mark owner or with his consent, the trademark owner
is no longer allowed further to control the distribution
of those goods. He has “exhausted” his distribution
right by the ﬁrst sale of the goods. There are basically
three different forms and concepts of exhaustion:
1. National exhaustion means that the trademark
right (or patent or copyright) is exhausted only
Table 1 International comparison of average per dosage
ex-manufacturer’s prices, common drugs, 1998 (US$)
Country
Number
of drugs
Average
price (US$)
Average price
relative to the USA
USA 19 2.72 1
Brazil 19 2.03 0.81
Mexico 18 2.02 0.76
Japan 8 1.33 0.74
Sweden 16 1.79 0.73
UK 20 1.85 0.7
Canada 19 1.63 0.63
South Africa 19 1.37 0.58
Czech Republic 17 1.18 0.56
Italy 20 1.39 0.55
Korea 18 1.35 0.54
Spain 17 1.35 0.52
Thailand 17 1.12 0.41
India 7 0.14 0.08
Source: IMS data, in Maskus [3].
Table 2 Average percent deviation from European mean prices
in pharmaceutical products, 1998
Country All 90 products Products in all 15 countries
Greece -28 -16
Spain -20 -12
Portugal -13 -4
Italy -13 -4
France -10 -1
Finland -2 -2
Austria -2 +0
Norway -1 -5
Sweden -1 -1
Belgium -1 +0
The Netherlands +2 +3
Denmark +3 +3
Germany +11 +8
UK +19 +12
Switzerland +25 +17
Source: Calculations by Mattias Ganslandt with data from Swedish Medical Products
Authority, in Maskus [3].
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with respect to the countries on the market of
which the goods were put. If the applicable law
follows only national exhaustion, a parallel
importer would infringe the relevant trademark
right in the country of importation. National
exhaustion (regarding patents) is being practiced,
e.g., in the United States and Switzerland. The
United States recognizes national exhaustion of
pharmaceutical patents, and gives the patent
holder the explicit right of importation [9]. In
Switzerland, the concept of national exhaustion is
also being followed: The Swiss high court under-
lined this in a decision in 1999, the so-called
“Kodak Trial” [10]. (Pharmaceutical products
beyond patent protection are allowed for parallel
trade in Switzerland though, a fact that will be
discussed at a later stage. It should be also men-
tioned at this point that there is a different legal
situation regarding trade mark rights: Whereas in
patents national exhaustion is being practiced, in
trade mark rights, international exhaustion is the
current modus operandi in Switzerland.)
2. Regional exhaustion means that the exhaustion
relates only to a market that is broader than the
purely national market but is nevertheless limited
to speciﬁc countries. The European Union (EU)
follows the concept of regional (EU-wide) exhaus-
tion whereby a company marketing a product in
one member state cannot object on the grounds of
trademark infringement to subsequent sales of
that product in any other member state [11]. The
concept of EU-wide exhaustion is tied to the free
movement of goods, founded in the Treaty of
Rome (Articles 30 and 36), which authorizes the
free movement of goods and confers the right to
control the import of goods by national govern-
ments, provided the products are not harmful or
pose a threat to the public. It was extended, under
an EU agreement, with certain European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland,
Norway, Liechtenstein, forming the European
Economic Area [EEA]). Regional exhaustion is
increasingly being discussed in North America:
Among others, a policy to admit parallel imports
has been proposed by US policymakers. Both the
US House of Representatives and the Senate
approved an amendment in 2007 that would
permit pharmacists and wholesalers to import
cheaper drugs from other countries [12].
3. International (global) exhaustion means that
the trademark right (or patent or copyright) is
exhausted by putting the goods on any market
anywhere in the world. If a jurisdiction adopts this
rule on exhaustion, owners of rights in the jurisdic-
tion cannot stop parallel imports into the jurisdic-
tion by reliance on IP rights alone. At present,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, South Africa,
Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, Argentina, Thai-
land, and New Zealand recognize international
exhaustion, allowing parallel importation of pat-
ented pharmaceuticals [13]. The principle of inter-
national exhaustion in the context of parallel trade
came under worldwide attention when, in 1997,
South Africa made an amendment to its Medicines
Act, permitting the Health Ministry to suspend
patent rights in special cases of urgency (namely,
the AIDS epidemic), as such legalizing parallel
imports of (copied) patented medicines like certain
high-priced AIDS treatments [14]. Following this,
39 pharmaceutical companies brought in 2001 an
action against the South African government con-
cerning the constitutional status of the Medicines
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act
[15]. Nevertheless, yielding to substantial pressure
from public opinion [16], the research-based com-
panies dropped their claim in April 2001.
Exhaustion and Its Political Implications
Opinions on exhaustion are very diverse internation-
ally. The choice on which concept to adapt depends
strongly on the presence of a local or regional research-
driven pharmaceutical industry. It is interesting to note
in this context that the World Trade Organization
(WTO) did not only touch the issue of exhaustion in
the treaty on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, but explicitly excluded it: “For the
purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement,
subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in
this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights” [17].
Importance of Parallel Trade
Key Economic Data
As said above, parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is a
multibillion euro business in the EU alone. To give an
example: The value of PPIs inGermany, the third largest
market for pharmaceuticals worldwide, reached EUR
1.25 billion in 2005, according to the German Associa-
tion of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies
[18]. Kanavos et al. [19] came to similar results in their
study. The detailed results and conclusions of this study
will be discussed later in this article. In Figure 1 below,
the volume of parallel trade of six EU countries, calcu-
lated by the authors of the above-mentioned study, are
depicted. The differential between Greece, the only net
(parallel) exporter and prime source for parallel
imports for the other countries, gives an idea on the
price differentials realized through this arbitrage.
The estimations of market share of parallel imports
differ also, but it is clear that in markets like, e.g.,
Denmark and the UK, parallel trade has reached a
signiﬁcant share of pharmacy market sales, reaching
15.7% and 14.5%, respectively, in these two countries
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in 2005 [20]. Figure 2 gives a detailed analysis from
the study of Kanavos et al. [19] of the market share of
PPT and its development in selected EU countries.
Health Care As a Macroeconomic Cost Factor
The phenomenon of parallel trade of pharmaceuticals
has to be seen in the context of mounting health-care
budgets in the developed world: Almost everywhere, a
substantial part of national income is spent for health,
reaching 11.6% and 15.3% of gross domestic product
(GDP), respectively, in Switzerland and the United
States (Fig. 3).
It is clear that there are different reasons for the
mounting health-care costs, among them general
progress in the medical sciences, and an aging popula-
tion in the industrialized countries. Nevertheless, drugs
are most often in the center of the discussion, as they
and with them the pharmaceutical industry are easy
identiﬁable targets in campaigns to curb national
health-care expenses. The actual rates to which drugs
contribute to those expenses range between 10.4% of
total health expenditures in Switzerland and 22.9% in
Spain (Fig. 4).
Political Context
As said, mounting health-care expenditures, together
with signiﬁcant international pricing variations, are a
situation which stimulates policymakers: They endorse
parallel trade with the long-term aim of a reduction of
drug prices. This is, e.g., reﬂected in the 1998 EU
commissions original Communication on the Single
Market in Pharmaceuticals [22] stating: “Wholesale
intermediaries buy products in lower priced parts of
the European Union and sell them in higher-priced
parts of the Union. In an effectively integrated market,
the prices of tradable goods tend to converge towards
a situation where arbitrage is no longer an issue; in this
sector, since maximum prices are ﬁxed in many
Member States, the price convergence pressure on
products already in the market will be towards lower
Market value of pharmaceutical parallel trade 
in selected EU countries
0.0
500.0
1000.0
1500.0
2000.0
2500.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
M
ar
ke
t V
al
u
e 
(M
io
. E
U
R
)
Sweden
Denmark
Germany
Greece 
Netherlands
UKFigure 1 Market value of pharmaceutical
parallel trade in six European Union (EU)
countries. Data source: Kanavos et al. [19].
Conversion of noneuro currencies (DKK, SEK,
GBP) into euro based on exchange rates as per
August 12, 2006.
Market share of pharmaceutical parallel trade
in selected EU countries
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
SE
DK
DE
GR
NL
UK
Figure 2 Market share of pharmaceutical
parallel trade in six European Union (EU)
countries. Source: Kanavos et al. [19].
Parallel Trade: Switzerland, the EU, and the United States 999
prices, at least for out-of-patent products. Unless par-
allel trade can operate dynamically on prices, it creates
inefﬁciencies because most, but not all, of the ﬁnancial
beneﬁt accrues to the parallel trader rather than to the
health care system or patient. Nevertheless, parallel
trade must equally be seen as an important driving
force for market integration and, consequently, for
achieving the Single Market.”
It is interesting to read in the above communication
that the European Commission speaks rather clearly of
a political and economic trade-off. The possibility that
most of the beneﬁt will go to the parallel trader (which
is the main argument against parallel trade given by
Kanavos et al. [19] in their London School of Econo-
mics and Political Science (LSE) study) is spoken out.
The European Commission also does stipulate clearly
and precisely that with the endorsement of parallel
trade, not only a tendency for lower prices for phar-
maceuticals throughout the EU is favored, but also one
of the great goals of the EU, the Single Market, is
supported through the driving force of parallel trade.
Possible Negative Effects of Parallel Trade
of Pharmaceuticals
Among others, two major risks of parallel trade can be
identiﬁed:
First, the authorization of parallel imports may open
the door to falsiﬁed products. The problem of counter-
feit drugs does not only concern developing countries
[23], but industrialized countries as well, as a recent
example shows: The British Medicines and Healthcare
Products RegulatoryAuthority published a drug alert in
May 2007 [24], informing the public that counterfeit
products appearing as French parallel imports were
introduced into the legal UK supply chain.
Second, it is often argued that parallel trade is under-
mining the ability of the research-based pharmaceutical
industry to develop new drugs and is staying competi-
tive through the fact that it does strip those companies
from proﬁts needed to perform further research and
development (R & D). Arfwedson remarks in 2004,
that empirical data show a certain coincidence with the
rise of parallel imports (plus dirigiste price controls) and
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industrialized countries, relative to GDP.
Source: OECD [21].
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the relative downfall of the European pharmaceutical
industry: The European share of the world pharmaceu-
tical market has declined from 32% to 22% over the
past decade; the United States share has increased from
31% to 43%. Additionally, many EU pharmaceutical
companies have moved their research centers to the
United States [25]. To attribute this relative downfall
only to the rise of parallel imports is most probably too
one-sided. In general, there are a lot of factors that play
a role in this development: The general social, eco-
nomic, and health-care environments as well as basic
ﬁnancial and regulatory conditions certainly play an
additional role here.
Assessments of Parallel Trade
Economic Research in the EU
The recent international research trying to ﬁnd objec-
tive data on beneﬁts of parallel trade in pharmaceuti-
cals is very controversial: Results differ vastly in
judgment of the welfare effects of the concerned coun-
tries or regions. The main ambiguity lies in the evalu-
ation of potential gains consumers (or better “payers,”
as costs for drugs are reimbursed in different degrees in
most European countries by health insurances) of
pharmaceutical products in high-price countries versus
potential of reduction of incentives to innovation in
research-driven pharmaceutical industries in the con-
cerned countries and areas.
West and Mahon come in the York study [26] in
2003 to the conclusions of signiﬁcant savings through-
out ﬁve European countries (UK, Germany, Sweden,
The Netherlands, Denmark) totaling EUR 631 million,
with evidence of indirect competitive effects through
forced reduction of prices, thus helping to contain
mounting public health-care expenditures in several
European countries. This is supported by the ﬁndings
of Ganslandt and Maskus [27]. They showed in their
2004 empirical analysis of the Swedish pharmaceutical
market between 1995 and 1998 that “prices of goods
subject to import competition, including parallel-
traded products themselves, fell approximately four
percent in the import market relative to the prices of
products not subject to parallel trade.” Moreover, their
econometric investigation suggests that original pro-
ducers cut prices by up to 19%, relative to other drug
prices, concluding that parallel imports represent a
signiﬁcant form of competition in markets such as
Sweden.
Maskus’ and Chen’s (theoretical) analysis of 2004
[28] suggests that in the presence of low trade costs,
allowing parallel imports is likely to increase welfare,
particularly within a region like the EU or North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Szymanski
[29] argues differently in 2004 through his calculation
of a negative effect on the UK pharmaceutical industry
of more than GBP 770 million (EUR 1140 million) per
year. With a gain of up to GBP 480 million for the UK
economy from parallel trade, the total net (negative)
effect on the UK economy (including the beneﬁt to
consumers of lower pharmaceutical prices) is calcu-
lated at more than GBP 290 million (EUR 430 million/
exchange rate as per August 12, 2006).
An important argument against parallel trade,
recently used by the above-mentioned authors
Kanavos et al. [19] in their so-called “LSE study,” is
the fact that the party mostly beneﬁting from parallel
trade is the parallel importer himself. Kanavos speaks
of modest beneﬁts for payers between 0.3% and 2.2%
of the total market, being substantially exceeded by
proﬁts for parallel importers, mounting to more than
EUR 700 million in 2002, with some EUR 500 million
of this total realized by British parallel importers. The
results of Kanavos et al. [19] have been challenged by
parallel importers, saying that with a different mode of
calculation, the results would have been similarly posi-
tive as those of the York study [30]. In their theoretical
work, Bordoy and Jelovac [31] ﬁnd a decreased total
welfare in countries with similar wealth and different
health insurance systems and an increased welfare in
the case of a different drug valuation. Enemark et al.
[32] come in their very recent work (“Odense Study,”
2006) to results similar to those of the York study and
very different to those of the LSE study: In their analy-
sis of four European countries (Denmark, Sweden,
Germany, UK) they estimate savings totaling EUR
441.5 million. The savings calculated by Enemark
et al. have decreased, compared to the 2001 estimates
of the York study. It is speculated that regulatory
changes as well as pan-European price convergence or
parallel importers stock-out, generated by increased
manufacturer restriction of deliveries have contributed
to this situation.
The results of the three major studies discussed
above are summarized and compared in Table 3.
Economic Research in Switzerland
Vaterlaus [33] calculates in 2005 the effect of a change
in exhaustion on drug prices in Switzerland: adoption
of regional exhaustion would lower wholesale prices
of drugs between 9% and 20%, adoption of interna-
tional exhaustion between 14% and 32%, thus leading
to nationwide savings on drug expenditures between
CHF 130 and 420 million (EUR 203–655 million).
These savings would be relatively higher than those
calculated in the aforementioned York study, because
of the higher price level in Switzerland, compared with
the countries analyzed in the latter (Germany, Sweden,
Denmark, UK, The Netherlands). The ﬁndings of
Vaterlaus [33] regarding a system change in patent
exhaustion on pharmaceuticals in Switzerland are col-
lected in Table 4.
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In a recent (2006) publication [34], the two authors
Weder and Barsuglia conclude that Swiss consumers
should proﬁt from an approval of PPIs in Switzerland
(assuming no negative impact on international R & D
through the relative small size of the Swiss pharmaceu-
tical market). They argue further that incomes of Swiss
pharmaceutical producers could fall if the worldwide
price level on patented drugs would decrease (because
of the reference price system) through parallel trade
into Switzerland. Although a switch toward a system
of regional exhaustion would seem conceivable on ﬁrst
sight, legal problems through different WTO regula-
tions and possibly difﬁcult negotiations with the EU
make this step difﬁcult to realize. Their opinion is that
in the present situation, regulatory measures, further
limiting maximum prices, would be a preferable way
to reach the goal of lowering the prices for patented
drugs.
Economic and Regulatory Environment in Switzerland
The situation of Switzerland regarding its pharma-
ceutical industry distinguishes it from that of other
countries.
First, for a small country of seven and a half million
inhabitants, it has a pharmaceutical industry of
remarkable size, with two Swiss companies (Novartis
and Roche) in a total of ﬁve European companies
(two British, two Swiss, one French) ranking in the
international top 10 (see Fig. 5).
Second, Switzerland has an extremely high export
rate in pharmaceuticals: 99% of the turnover of the
Swiss companies is realized abroad [36]. Local R & D
still plays an enormous role in Switzerland, even under
the conditions of globalization. This becomes further
clear when investments on pharmaceutical R & D
throughout Europe are compared: The amount for
R & D in Switzerland is, with EUR 2.3 billion, almost
as high (90.1%) as the entire market value (EUR
2.55 billion, 2003). (see Fig. 6 for details).
Third, as already mentioned in the beginning of this
article, the exhaustion legislation is diverse: Regarding
trademarks and copyrights, Switzerland recognizes
international exhaustion of rights, whereas in patents,
national exhaustion is practiced. A possible adoption
of a regional exhaustion is made difﬁcult through the
fact that Switzerland did not join the EEA, like other
EFTA members (e.g., Norway, Liechtenstein), and that
an adoption of regional exhaustion would change also
the more liberal international exhaustion regime in
trademarks, which could lead to legal problems with
the WTO, as reported by the Swiss Federal Council
[38].
The current regulatory practice regarding the
admission of PPIs into Switzerland can be summarized
as follows: Pharmaceutical products beyond patent
protection can be imported from a country with an
equivalent system of drug regulation [39]. The Swiss
drug regulatory authority (Swissmedic) publishes the
countries which are regarded to have an equivalent
system of drug authorization [40]. These are, at
present, the EU (excluding Poland and Slovenia) plus
EFTA/EEA member states, Australia, Japan, Canada,
and the United States [41].
Conclusions
In general, parallel trade of pharmaceuticals remains a
frequently discussed topic. Results and conclusions of
research in this ﬁeld are very different, sometimes even
contradictory. This could be due to the fact of spon-
soring of studies by different stakeholders. To name the
three most important recent studies on parallel
imports: while the York and Odense studies have been
sponsored by the European Association of Euro-
Table 3 Comparison of three major studies on the effects of pharmaceutical parallel imports
Author (study) Norway Germany Sweden Denmark UK Netherl. Total Comp.Total*
West and Mahon 2003 (York)
Direct savings (mio. EUR) 194 47 16 342 32 631 599
Kanavos et al. [19] (LSE)
Direct savings (mio. EUR) 0.563 17.73 3.77 3.002 6.887 12.762 44.714 31.4
Direct savings (w Clawback) 55.887 19.119 100.071 80.4
Enemark et al. [32] (Odense)
Direct savings (mio. EUR) 145 45.3 14.2 237 441.5 441.5
*Comp. total, total of countries included in all three studies (DE, SE, DK, UK).
Table 4 Effects of a change in patent exhaustion on the Swiss
pharmaceutical market
Switzerland (year 2000 data) Mio. CHF Mio. EUR
Market value (public price) 5456 3497
Proportion wholesale price–public price 57.20%
Market value (wholesale price) 3100 1987
Proportion of patent protected products 59.40%
Max. concerned trade volume (wholesale
price level)
1854 1188
PPI volume (regional exhaustion) 650–1100 417–705
Price lowering potential (regional exhaustion) 9–20%
PPI volume (international exhaustion) 900–1300 577–833
Price lowering potential (international
exhaustion)
14–32%
Data source: Vaterlaus [33]. Conversion of CHF into EUR based on exchange rate as
per August 12, 2006.
PPI, pharmaceutical parallel import.
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Pharmaceutical Companies, the parallel importers’
European representative, the LSE study, was sponsored
by Johnson & Johnson, a pharmaceutical company.
Parallel trade of pharmaceuticals takes place in a
playgroundwith different stakeholders having different
and contradictory interests: the multinational pharma-
ceutical industry with their interest of maximizing
proﬁt; national governments with the interest of
keeping a research-based industry offering high number
of qualiﬁed jobs on the one hand, and on the other hand
keeping costs for health care low, or at least, reduce
their growth; health insurers (and their clients!) heading
for low monthly fees; and last but not least, parallel
importers to make use of the existing legal possibilities
to realize proﬁts out of price differentials.
Parallel imports depend on the legal environment of
an economic area. This is even more the case with
pharmaceuticals, because of the highly regulated dis-
tribution of drugs. Drug prices remain a target of
politicians worldwide, because of their visibility and to
the relative ease with which this sector of the health-
care industry can be manipulated. On the other hand,
the economic power of the pharmaceutical industry,
especially of the big globally acting companies, is of
inﬂuence, especially in countries where pharmaceutical
industries are big taxpayers and providers of qualiﬁed
workplaces. Because of this, parallel trade remains an
issue in the EU and will become a greater issue in the
United States and in Switzerland, two countries with
high drug price levels and a very strong pharmaceutical
industry.
Further research is needed to investigate this ﬁeld in
the most objective manner possible. To do this, it is of
prime importance to standardize evaluation methods,
as well as to increase quality and quantity of available
objective information to empower science to perform
sound analysis and to enable decision-makers to imple-
ment informed and well-balanced decisions.
Source of ﬁnancial support: None.
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Figure 5 Top ten pharmaceutical companies in
the world (2006 global pharmaceutical sales,
US$ billion). Data source: Interpharma [35].
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Figure 6 Investments in pharmaceutical re-
search and development (R & D) relative to
national market value in Europe. Data source:
EFPIA [37].
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